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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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SHOULD WE BE IN BOSNIA?
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
FOR USING MILITARY FORCE

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

C. L. Christman

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ABSTRACT

The Bosnia conflict is very complex; history, nationalism, religion, and ethnicity are discussed as key factors in understanding the depth of hostilities. A brief overview of United Nations peacekeepers, Security Council actions, and the Vance-Owen peace plan is provided. Operational level considerations include problems in defining the mission, the nature of the enemy, and the effects of geography, terrain, and infrastructure. Also detailed are the constraints of time, force composition, and whether military forces can win in Bosnia. Recommendations concerning employment of American military forces include:

- * no employment as peacekeepers unless there is an established cease fire.

- * If diplomacy fails, any offensive action should be taken by a European coalition force sanctioned by the United Nations but under European, preferably NATO, command.

Other recommendations include support for negotiations, greater economic pressures, war crimes hearings, withdrawal of peacekeepers, and lifting the arms embargo.

Balkans history shows that foreign domination and military forces are not very effective in establishing long standing borders. Military intervention by European and United States forces may temporarily suppress hostilities; only the Balkans people may solve the problems caused by ethnic diversity.

PREFACE

Bosnia's political and diplomatic environment is very fluid and subject to daily, even hourly, change. In addition to the Muslim, Serb and Croat participants, the international community is actively involved through the United Nations/Security Council, the West European Union, the European Community, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The on-going war is forcing world communities to consider such issues as the right of self-determination of people, how a nation is defined and the role of ethnic conflict in modern country disputes. The purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamic factors of operational level planning for military action in Bosnia and how they may help determine any commitment of United States forces.

While exploring the broad question, "Should We Be in Bosnia?", every attempt has been made to maintain currency. However, it became necessary to select a cut off date for including topical information. President Clinton's early February 1993 announcement of baseline United States policy on Bosnia has eased the immediate pressure for United States force deployment. However, this policy includes United States armed forces support for any United Nations actions in Bosnia. It is therefore considered that the issue of United States military involvement and the depth of force commitment is still open to debate.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	11
PREFACE	iii
I INTRODUCTION	1
The Problem	1
United Nations Peacekeeping, Negotiations and Resolutions.....	2
Conclusions	8
II UNIQUE ASPECTS OF THE BOSNIA AREA IN CONFLICT	10
Historical and Political Borders	10
Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism	15
Ethnic Conflict	17
Conclusions	18
III OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTION IN BOSNIA	21
The Operational Landscape	21
Defining the Mission	22
Who is the Enemy	26
Geography, Terrain, and Infrastructure	28
Constraints of Time	30
Forces	35
Can Military Forces Win	37
IV RECOMMENDATIONS ON EMPLOYING UNITED STATES FORCES IN BOSNIA	41
V SUMMARY	45
APPENDIX I--UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS	47
II--LANGUAGES, ETHNIC GROUPS, AND RELIGIONS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS	49
III--HISTORICAL BORDERS OF EASTERN EUROPE	51
IV--LAND FEATURES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS	54
NOTES	59
BIBLIOGRAPHY	63

SHOULD WE BE IN BOSNIA?
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR USING MILITARY FORCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem.

"Should We Be in Bosnia?" is a question which strikes deeply into the American conscience. It evokes a powerful response: of outrage at the inhuman acts of war; of balancing the right thing to do against what may be done; of trading American lives to protect an unknown, distant people. The answer to the question begins with the appeal to the human soul.

Sarajevo. Snipers shoot at bundled figures scurrying across modern, deserted roads. Artillery bombardment has reduced historic buildings to stone and concrete rubble. Elderly men and women with faces deeply lined by age and hopelessness keep from freezing to death by huddling under thin blankets on iron cots. Young children are blank-eyed and without laughter; older children carry and use the weapons of modern warfare. Young women are brutally gang raped; they hate the unborn children they carry as a by-product of war.

This is the nature of war in Bosnia. The pictures fill the front pages of newspapers and open morning and evening televised newscasts. Satellite links and on-site reporters with mini cams bring real-time fire fights and gut wrenching

human anguish to global audiences. From armchair comfort, we monitor the devastation of war as easily as a sports event. The parallel is ironic; Sarajevo in 1984 was a sparkling, modern city filled with Olympic spirit and peaceful athletic competition. Today, Sarajevo is a killing zone in a conflict Americans find difficult to understand and which seems increasingly beyond negotiated resolution.

United Nations: Peacekeeping,
Resolutions, and a Proposal for Peace.

Peacekeeping. The United Nations is chartered to "maintain international peace and security"; to prevent and remove threats to the peace, suppress aggression, and settle international disputes.¹ In civil wars such as Bosnia, the United Nations has become a preferred arbitrator because it is concerned with reducing violence but does not have its own national interests to promote/protect.²

United Nations peacekeeping forces are not deployed against an identified enemy or to deter an aggressor. They must be completely impartial and, although armed, use weapons only in self defense and not to enforce the United Nation's will.³ In monitoring borders, cease fires and human rights, peacekeepers act as a buffer between hostile forces and cannot prevent armed conflict. Therefore, they are effective only when all hostile parties want peace and are not determined to continue armed combat.⁴

In the following discussion of peacekeeping already underway in Bosnia, and later consideration of United States force involvement, it is important to understand how these operations are funded.

In Bosnia, humanitarian escort costs are paid by the troop contributing countries. All other peacekeeping expenses, in Bosnia and other countries, are paid by United Nations members based on Gross National Product (GNP). In this regard, the United States annually pays over 30% of all United Nations peacekeeping costs. With estimated 2-4 billion price tag, the United States will be a major contributor to a proposed 20,000 to 50,000 member Bosnia buffer force⁵, whether or not any United States troops are physically present. It is certainly within American economic interests to closely monitor the effectiveness of Bosnia peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeepers in Bosnia. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed in Bosnia faces many problems in their peacekeeping role. Officially established in February 1992, the UNPROFOR was to "create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis".⁶ However, neither Serbs nor Muslims seemed committed to a non-violent solution to the Bosnia conflict. Cease fires were continually negotiated and violated by both sides. On-going fighting and roadblocks hampered humanitarian relief efforts, with food convoys

refused entry to besieged Muslim cities by Serb forces.

Although the conditions for effective peacekeeping operations were steadily getting worse, UNPROFOR was strengthened to provide additional airport security at Sarajevo for humanitarian efforts.⁷ By August 1992, peacekeeper's fatal casualties totaled 12 with more to follow. September brought a temporary suspension of humanitarian airlift after an Italian Air Force relief plane was shot down, killing four crew member.⁸

Peacekeeping in Bosnia is at a standstill. Bosnia's Serbs and Muslims appear increasingly unable to see maintenance of cease-fires and separation of warring groups as in their best interests. Although peacekeepers were able to neutralize the ethnic conflicts for a short while, the lack of progress towards resolution has now undermined their ability to keep hostilities under control.⁹

United Nations Resolutions. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called Bosnia "one of the worst humanitarian emergencies of our time."¹⁰ Responding to increasing casualties, displaced persons averaging 30,000 per day, and human rights violations, the United Nations General Assembly called on the Security Council to end fighting and "restore the unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia."¹¹

In September 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed its first resolution concerning conflict in the former

Yugoslav republics. In addition to calling for strict adherence to a cease-fire, an international embargo was imposed on the delivery of weapons and military equipment.¹²

Subsequent actions sought to increase pressure for a diplomatic solution. Counsel resolutions demanded an immediate end to fighting in Bosnia, the immediate cessation of outside interference, including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and elements of the Croatian army, and that all irregulars disarm and disband.¹³ Economic sanctions included an embargo on Yugoslav products/commodities and financial/economic contracts. Also suspended were sports contracts, scientific and cultural exchanges, and all air transit except for humanitarian aid flights.¹⁴ APPENDIX I provides a Chronology of Security Council Actions.

In August 1992, the Security Council officially recognized the Bosnia conflict as a threat to international peace and security.¹⁵ Responding to the General Assembly, the Council condemned the "violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" of Bosnia, the massive violations of human rights and ethnic cleansing. It repeated the demand for all Yugoslav People's Army and Croatian Army Units to be withdrawn, subjected to Bosnian government authority, or disarmed and disbanded.¹⁶

The potential for a peaceful resolution of hostilities appeared to increase. During an August 1992 international conference in London, all parties to the Yugoslav conflict

accepted a settlement with the following key provisions:

- * recognition of Bosnia by all former Yugoslav republics,
- * integrity of present frontiers unless changed by mutual agreement,
- * the principle of acquisition of territory by force would not be accepted.¹⁷


However, hostile action in Bosnia continued to escalate. Serbs continued to refuse entrance of humanitarian aid convoys to besieged areas and resumed shelling of Muslim cities. Muslim irregulars mounted new offensives to drive Serbs from their territory. Security Council resolutions on disarmament and placing heavy weapons under international control were ignored.

Proposed Peace Plan. Joint negotiators Lord Owen, representing the European Community, and Cyrus Vance, representing the United Nations, have proposed a peace plan which divides Bosnia into 10 independent cantons. There is great pressure on the international community, Serbs, Croats and Muslims to support/agree to this initiative, not necessarily because it is the best plan, but simply because it is the only plan. However, neither Muslims nor Serbs are in full agreement with the proposed cantons. Muslims feel they have lost most of their state and are not provided enough territory. Serbs protest a 40% loss of land taken by warfare.

Hostile action has increased as both sides seek to strengthen their bargaining position by seizing as much land as possible.

FIGURE 1

TEN AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES:
THE PROPOSED DIVISION OF BOSNIA



MUSLIMS

1
5
9

SERBS

2
4
6

CROATS

3
8
10

SPECIAL STATUS
(SARAJEVO)

7

% TERRITORY

28.8% - Muslims
25.4% - Croats
42.3% - Serbs
3.5% - Sarajevo

% POPULATION

56.1% - Muslims
63.4% - Croats
52.8% - Serbs
14.0% - Muslims
10.7% - Serbs
6.9% - Croats

Even if the division by independent cantons is eventually approved, it is questionable whether it will provide any long term resolution of conflict. The designated ethnic group for each proposed canton barely constitutes a majority; the friction of sizeable ethnic minorities is multiplied by the number of cantons. Each ethnic canton has 'unfriendly borders', and Sarajevo remains a microcosm of present day Bosnia with a mixed Serb, Croat, and Muslim populace. Each of these factors constitutes a flash-point for resurgent ethnic disputes.

Finally, the Vance-Owen plan does not address the issue of Bosnia's territorial integrity as an internationally recognized independent state. Instead, it continues to validate a national determination by ethnicity and delays the establishment of a broad based democratic government which protects the rights of all her people.

Conclusions.

Americans are by nature neither a patient people, nor accustomed to helpless inaction. Violence, casualties, and the brutal human rights violations of ethnic cleansing continue to escalate. United Nations peacekeepers are caught in a cross fire between two warring groups who blame each other for all the ills of their war. Massive numbers of people are displaced from their homes; food and humanitarian aid are withheld and cease fires violated.

The deadlocked diplomatic negotiations and the constant, haunting pictures of the people of war goad us to take action, to do something. The outlet of our growing frustrations becomes the demand to use military force. When emotions run high, the realities of military operations easily become lost. However the question remains - should the United States commit military forces to Bosnia in support of United Nations resolutions?

CHAPTER II

UNIQUE ASPECTS OF THE BOSNIA AREA IN CONFLICT

Introduction.

Before examining the aspects of military operations in Bosnia, a brief background of historical, social, and religious factors in this regional conflict is provided. Specific consideration is given to the dynamics of 20th century events, nationalism and religion, and ethnic conflict. These elements are critical in understanding the emotional depth of conflict and evaluating how successful proposed action may be in resolving hostilities.

A people's history tells how they respond to force and diplomacy, and what issues are consistently at the heart of conflict. Failure to appreciate the importance of these underlying historical and/or societal root causes may lead to action which is ineffective or which increases the scope or intensity of conflict.

Historical and Political Borders.

Joseph V. Stalin defined a nation as "a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." 1 In this context, the former Yugoslavia was a nation made up of several nations defined by cultural and geographical boundaries. In her creation, Yugoslavia placed

in opposition the drive for a single nation with a national identity as Yugoslavs and her people's identification of self and nation through their individual ethnic heritage.


Yugoslavia's regional ethnic, or cultural, groups of peoples were subject to great foreign influences, from the Turkish Ottoman empire in Macedonia, Bosnia and Serbia, to Latin or Venetian control of Dalmatia and Austro-Hungarian rule in Croatia and Slovenia.² Diverse foreign domination, combined with religious and ethnic nationalism, has produced the extremely complex configuration of cultures, peoples, nations and nationalities presently at war in Bosnia.

The Yugoslav federal system established separate republics for the major Slavic groups - the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians - within which that language and culture would be dominant.³ The Bosnia republic was created for the Serb, Croat, and Slavic Muslim people of the central mountain region. The two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina (Hungarians) and Kosovo (Albanians) were established for these two largest non-Slavic minorities.⁴

Each republic was characterized by the distinct cultural and national identity of the predominant ethnic group.⁵ The exception was Bosnia whose inhabitants did not make up a single cultural identity or nation.⁶ The geographic borders and ethnic concentrations of the former Yugoslav republics are shown in Figure 2. (See APPENDIX II for Languages, Ethnic Groups, and Religions of the Former Yugoslav Republics.)

FIGURE 2

ETHNIC GROUPS IN
THE REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Source: The Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1992

The basic regional structure of Yugoslavia was determined in Article One of the original Yugoslav Constitution:

The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights, who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, have expressed their will to live together in a federal state.⁷

Before the 1960's, great emphasis was placed on developing a common Slavic identity and a sense of Yugoslav nationality instead of a republic national identity. In the middle 1960's, the drive for a central Yugoslav identity was perceived as a threat to the republic's individual cultures, traditions, and interests.⁸ Most non-Serb groups associated Yugoslavism with the idea of a "Greater Serbia", which served to increase focus on national differences rather than similarities. To ease regional tensions, the republics were given greater economic and political decision making power which made them increasingly autonomous. The republics eventually became the key units of government when Yugoslavia was established as a Confederation by the Constitutional amendments of 1971.⁹

However, this decentralization of political power gave greater rise to regional nationalism. In 1972, the Yugoslav Party condemned nationalistic "unitarism", associated with Serbs and creation of a Greater Serbia, and "separatism", associated with Croatian nationalism which saw Croatia as better off outside the Yugoslav federation.¹⁰ In 1974, a new

Constitution established the conditions under which the states operated. With the death of Tito in 1980, the Yugoslav government transitioned to a Collective Presidency system, which provided a rotating presidency for equal representation of each constituent republic.

In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions against communism, the Collective Presidency became unable to resolve the republic's disagreement over Yugoslavia's new structure. While Croatia and Slovenia favored a loose confederation, Serbia and Montenegro wanted a tightly centralized government; Bosnia and Macedonia favored a compromise agreement. With the start of the Yugoslav civil war, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia were the first to declare their independence. Their early recognition as independent states by Germany helped set the stage for other claims to statehood, particularly as the remaining Yugoslavia was now dominantly Serb. To escape a restrictive minority status, Bosnia's Muslim and Croat majority voted to secede from Yugoslavia and establish an independent nation.¹¹ What was left of former Yugoslavia was reconstituted as a Yugoslav Federation consisting of Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia with Vojvodina and Kosovo provinces.

In the new Bosnia, Serbs were now the minority and the prospect of living under Muslim and Croat leadership inflamed old animosities. Historically, the Serbs considered their strong Orthodox tradition responsible for their survival.

Orthodoxy united and sustained Serbs in their rebellion against Muslim rule under the Ottoman Empire and during World War II, when Germany's Croat (Catholic) allies participated in the slaughter of Serb partisans. The Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Serbian Republic leader Slobodan Milosevic, began a violent campaign of terror to both kill non-Serbs and create such an atmosphere of fear that Muslims and Croats would leave Bosnian territory. Constant artillery and sniper fire, methodical rape of Muslim women, siege-driven starvation, and the destruction of historic buildings, churches, and mosques were employed to 'ethnically cleanse' Bosnia of non-Serb peoples. By methodically killing and driving out the Muslims and Croats, Serbs sought ethnic dominance in a Bosnia then free to join the Yugoslav Federation in a "Greater Serbia".

Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism.

Ethnicity, religion, and nationalism are key to understanding the Bosnia conflict. In the social structure of the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, these three elements are interdependent and mutually defining; their combination is the root cause of the current ethnic warfare.

The first consideration is the issue of nationalism. It is important to realize that how nationalism is determined differs according to where a person lives, particularly between east and west. Americans and Europeans west of the Rhine traditionally have a territorial concept of nationality,

that nationality is an "allegiance to the state, residence therein, and submission to its jurisdiction".¹² In Eastern Europe, two different forms of nationalistic determination are found - eastern and southern nationalism. Eastern nationalism reflects the influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Catholic Church, while southern nationalism shows the influence of the Ottoman Empire.¹³ (See APPENDIX III for Historical Borders of Eastern Europe.)

The Eastern view of nationalism is in terms of cultural, religious, and historical identity - who a person is rather than where, geographically, they reside. More simply, nationalism is defined by the person, not the territory.¹⁴ In this Eastern context, loyalty to the nation (people) and loyalty to the state (territory) are not the same and may even be incompatible.¹⁵ Southern nationalism is similar to Eastern nationalism in that it also centers upon heritage and personal identity rather than territory. However, Southern nationalism has an additional element; identification of the person by religion has greater significance than other cultural factors.¹⁶ This increased emphasis on religion in determining national boundaries is a hold over from the millet system of the Ottoman Empire where people were organized into governing districts by religion not geography. The legacy of the millet system then is a person's religious identity determining their national identity.¹⁷

For the Slavic people of the former Yugoslavia, ethnic

derivation determined nationality, with religion as a key element of ethnic determination.¹⁸ The original Yugoslav Republics were drawn along ethnic lines, with each major group provided its own ethnically dominant state. Following the 1989 revolutions, Slovenia's established ethnic majority experienced little internal conflict in declaring independent statehood. For Croatia, conflict has centered in territory where ethnic Serbs constitute or seek to establish a majority.

Bosnia, however, exists as a multi-ethnic state within the multi-ethnic territory of the former Yugoslavia. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia, and the other former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia's borders were determined by geography instead of cultural identity. And within these borders live the people of three diverse ethnic groups - Serbs (Eastern Orthodox), Croats (Roman Catholic), and Muslims (Islam) - each with a singular, cultural composition.

Ethnic Conflict.

Ethnicity is consistently used to characterize the nature of the Bosnian conflict and is likely to become a greater issue in future world conflicts. As in Bosnia, many modern nations with multiple ethnic groups have not developed effective political measures to resolve territorial or economic competition, oppression of minority groups, or disputes concerning rights and values.¹⁹ The former Soviet Union alone contains over 13 ethnic nationalities speaking

more than 15 languages. The following general characteristics of ethnic conflict are provided to underscore the complexity of the Bosnian conflict, the potential for escalated violence, and wide range of issues that must be considered in ending hostilities.

Ethnic conflict requires "the coexistence of two or more culturally differentiated communities under a single political authority... Cultural differentiation can result from religion, language, race, national experience, or a combination of these forces".²⁰ Ethnic violence results from "aggressive impulses activated by societal stress, such as rapid urbanization, economic depression, or frustrated expectations." It has great potential for unrestrained and increasing violence which is destructive and damaging to all participants²¹ and is responsible for increasing numbers of the world's refugees.²²

Violent ethnic conflict often results when the pressure of belonging to a particular group creates an abstract identification of us vs them,²³ with stereotyping and dehumanization creating a relationship based on superiority and inferiority.²⁴ This relationship becomes the justification for brutality and violence committed on lesser humans.

Conclusions.

The unexpected dissolution of the Soviet Union and her

satellite countries has been accompanied by an almost instantaneous change from a communist to a democratic style government. However, severe economic distress and issues of defining a state/nation of peoples that were long suppressed by totalitarian governments have released deep seated hostilities and renewed age old ethnic conflicts. This is particularly true for the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

As these republics declare independent statehood, the question of a people's right to exist as a separate state according to self-determination becomes very important. The issue takes on additional complexity in ethnic conflicts, where there are issues of genocide and forced expulsion from the state.

In Bosnia, the Muslim and Croat majority democratically voted for independent statehood. In their view, ethnicity within the state has given rise to a brutal civil war which seeks to drive ethnic peoples from their historical homes and kill those that remain. The continued violence within Bosnia has strained their fragile alliance, giving rise to increased ethnic clashes between Muslim and Croat. For the Bosnian Serbs, in the choice between an ethnic or a state identity, chose loyalty to their ethnic group, not the territorial state. The Bosnian Serb rejection of minority status is easily joined with the Yugoslav Federation desire for a "Greater Serbia" - when co-nationals make up a minority in one or more states, there is the "desire to redraw existing

political boundaries in order to redeem these lost co-nationals".25

How Bosnia's right to independent statehood is determined and the form of her existence sets a critically important precedence in resolving ethnic conflict. Any diplomatic or military proposals to end the war must consider whether Bosnia exists by ethnic division or according to the democratically expressed desires of the majority. Bosnian Serbs now hold over 70% of Bosnia territory and are close to attaining a Serb majority. To this end, their brutal tactics and continued aggression while playing at the negotiating table have allowed them to win by default. Although the current Vance-Owen peace plan reduces their territory to approximately 40%, the Bosnian Serb aggression has still been rewarded by a 30% increase in land holdings. This removes any incentive to negotiate or cease offensive actions; hostilities in Bosnia will probably continue and may spread.

If new borders drawn for Bosnia without some resolution of the ethnic and nationalistic roots of conflict, any peace will be merely a precursor to renewed conflict. No matter how the land is divided, an ethnic majority and minority will remain, holding the seeds of renewed ethnic fighting.

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTION IN BOSNIA

The Operational Landscape.

The goal of any military operation must be the achievement of clearly stated national and military strategies. However, the articulation of these strategies does not, in itself, guarantee the success or bring about the failure of any military endeavor. It is instead a broad marker of the beginning - what I want to do - and the end - have I done it - of military action. Everything in between these two points is operational planning of tasks, assets, and resources for mission execution by tactical war fighters.

But what does this have to do with potential US military involvement in Bosnia? United States national and military strategy is global in orientation -

- * Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations...

- Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic, and social progress.¹

but does tie broad strategic objectives to employing military forces in regional conflicts.

- * A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

- Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.²

More specific military strategic goals may be articulated as the basis of American military intervention in Bosnia, such as supporting the United Nation's efforts to uphold human rights. Other goals may be to protect the security, stability, and political freedom of Bosnia or simply stop aggression and military action in Bosnia. An additional consideration may be keeping conflict from spreading to other Balkan countries. In any case, two critical questions -

Is military action in Bosnia suitable to
achieving national/military strategic goals?

and

What is the probability of success?
must be answered by objective examination of the operational landscape of Bosnia's theater of action.

Defining the Mission.

The heart of operational planning is the mission - a clear and definitive statement of the objective, of what military forces are expected to do. The simply stated strategic goal of halting aggression in Bosnia and protecting human rights, security, and political freedom takes on exceptional complexity in determining how - militarily - you are going to achieve that objective.

In developing a Bosnia mission statement, the first determination is who's side are you on? Use of offensive force excludes employment as peacekeepers; and UNPROFOR's

inability to reduce hostilities makes it highly doubtful that simply increasing the force size would bring greater success. Peacemaking forces, however, tend to intervene on behalf of one side of conflicting factions. It has become relatively easy over succeeding months to support Bosnian Muslim and Croat vice Bosnian Serb issues, largely due to human rights atrocities and the practice of ethnic cleansing. With artillery bombardment of once modern cities and deliberate targeting of civilian populations, it is difficult to appreciate any Bosnian Serb point of view. However, the conflict has not always been so clear cut, and human rights violations and war atrocities have been committed by both sides. Both Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats have been accused of concentration camp treatment of war prisoners. And although the Serbs brutally apply modern weapons in nineteenth century style warfare, it does not negate consideration of their right of self determination.

At this point in time, the Bosnian Serb reluctance to negotiate in good faith, continual violation of cease fires, and increased targeting of civilians, particularly the young and old, have solidified American sympathies on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. If we assume that military intervention will be to stop Bosnian Serb aggression, does the military mission then become 'defend Bosnia' or 'support the freely elected government'? And which Bosnia is to be defended - the original republic borders, the borders of war-acquired

territory, or the cantons of the Vance-Owen plan.

Determining whether actual operations will be offensive or defensive is another major consideration. Traditionally, American forces seize and retain the initiative - a hallmark of offensive operations. But in Bosnia, what is the target of offensive action? The Bosnian Serbs live throughout the state and are a highly mobile militia capable of disappearing into the mountains. They intimately know the territory, are reinforced/resupplied by Serbia and Yugoslav Army forces, and do not need maps to maneuver. Individually digging Serbs from Bosnia strongholds would be a massive and lengthy process of questionable success; even the Germans failed to capture the Serbian partisans of World War II.³

Much recent discussion of the Bosnia conflict calls for the use of air power; but determining the proper targets has escaped definition. Offensive air strikes against artillery - most of which is mobile and hard to find in the mountainous terrain - would be difficult. The close proximity of many artillery sites to the civilian population would require pinpoint accuracy, and ground control may be required to avoid civilian casualties. This is assuming that the United Nations would support such action and appropriate host country agreements may be secured for any land based air offensive.

Air strikes external to Bosnia into the Yugoslav Federation would be difficult to justify as Serbia's assistance to Bosnian Serbs is not all that different from

United States counterinsurgency support to other countries. Besides, Serbia has stated it has no territorial claims on Bosnia; that all army forces have withdrawn except for "certain elements" remaining in Bosnia "as citizens of that republic" over which it has no control.⁴ An offensive strike 'taking it home' to downtown Belgrade similar to the highly successful Desert Storm strikes on Baghdad is likely to be interpreted as an act of war against the Yugoslav Federation.

Enforcing the no fly zone is easier said than done, particularly in the relatively small operating area. Low flying helicopters, if even detected, may easily slip over the Yugoslav Federation border before interdicting aircraft may arrive from Adriatic Sea carriers. Detailed Rules of Engagement for intercept and possible shoot down of no-fly zone violators would be required with clear warning to all warring factions.

Conversely, will a defensive mission use military forces to defend selected Bosnian cities? Inactivity and a forced wait for enemy action make it very difficult for garrison forces to keep their fighting trim. As not all cities can be reinforced, the Bosnian Serbs may easily select alternate, unreinforced towns and change their offensive target before supporting forces can respond. The initiative would remain with the Bosnian Serbs; American forces must either remain static or chase the Serb forces from town to town.

This difficulty in coming to grips with the military

mission is symptomatic of the complexity of the conflict in Bosnia. But perhaps the hardest aspect of this mission is how to limit involvement once action has begun and avoid escalation of hostilities. The Bosnia conflict does not have a clear point of resolution and the desired end state is undetermined. Once the first forces are on the ground, getting out may not be possible without making an already bad situation worse.

Ultimately, when even the broadest parameters in detailing the objective remain elusive, it should be considered whether a military option is a desirable course of action.

Who is the Enemy.

Before any armed action is taken against an aggressor, the actual war fighters must be able to tell friend from foe. For American ground forces, it may be hard to identify the enemy, especially after the first shots are fired. Bosnia and Yugoslavia are countries which Americans have normally only considered from the aspect of war with the former Soviet Union. The language, social/ethnic basis of conflict, and evolving political environment all present the average soldier with considerable barriers in understanding why he is there. The Bosnian Serb forces are predominantly a militia - a civilian army of local residents reinforced by Yugoslav Federation soldiers and volunteers from other countries. Some

wear uniforms or military style berets and clothing; many wear no uniforms at all. They speak the local dialect and are often the former friends, neighbors, and relatives of the very people they are fighting. Bosnian Muslim, Croat, Serb - all are Slavs, with a national distinction made by religion. Perhaps the only benefit of the ongoing ethnic warfare is the relative consolidation of ethnic factions into defined territories.

The Serbs earned a reputation as fierce fighting partisans against the Germans in World War II and in their resistance to conquest during occupation by the Ottoman Empire. The historic ties of the Orthodox Church to Serbian survival explosively unite religion and politics in a common purpose, and the Bosnian Serbs become like freedom fighters in a holy war.

Despite the United Nations arms embargo, Bosnian Serbs are well armed with the weapons of the former Yugoslavia. Their resources for continuing the conflict are considerable, with popular support and resupply of both men and arms from the Yugoslav Federation. Expressions of Russian sympathy with Serbian claims to Bosnia territory make it highly probable that far greater resources will be available to the Serbs if conflict escalates.

For United States ground forces, the similarity to the Vietnam war cannot be avoided. Like the Viet Cong, Bosnian Serbs are totally integrated into their environment and have

external arms support. Their flexibility, freedom to maneuver, and choose the time/place of battle make them highly effective against more organized troops. With few readily apparent means of identifying friend from enemy, American soldiers may be hard pressed to concentrate force against Serbs or adequately defend Muslims.

Geography, Terrain and Infrastructure.

Bosnia's land area is approximately the size of the state of Tennessee. It is bordered by Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro with a small coastline on the Adriatic Sea. Bosnia's terrain is predominantly hilly and mountainous with sharp peaks and ridges, deep gorges, and narrow valleys as significant features.⁵

Land areas neighboring Bosnia range from coastal to interior highlands and mountains to northeastern plains. Over 60% of the former Yugoslavia is marked with ridges 200-1,000 meters high; an additional 20% has mountains over 1,000 meters high.⁶ Mountains in the west and northwest sections resemble the higher Austrian Alps, with the Julian Alps among the most rugged in Europe.⁷

Bosnia's climate ranges from temperate near the coast to extreme cold in the mountains. The relatively small coastal area is Mediterranean in nature, mild with rainy winters. The higher elevations are influenced by cold, northern continental air currents and are characterized by hot summers/cold winters

and cool summers/long, snowy winters.⁸

Bosnia's rail, air and road infrastructure is not ideal for fast, sustained movement of troops and supplies. There are two main airports with Sarajevo as the center for relief supply flights into Bosnia. Before the war, existing highways were half paved and half gravel/earth. The extent of artillery damage and interruption of routine repair is not available. Bosnia has no year round internal waterways and no maritime ports.⁹ See APPENDIX IV for maps of geographical borders, topography, transportation systems, and major cities.

The combination of the rugged topography, cold winter climate, and lesser developed in-country transportation facilities has a major impact on any military operations in Bosnia. Bosnia's lack of port facilities in its small coastal area prohibits door to door sealift of supplies. Limited air facilities make it very difficult to airlift large amounts of men and materials into the operating area. The Bosnian Serb artillery and surface to air capability would pose a constant threat to any large scale and continuing airlift operations.

Once in theater, supply stockpiles would be in key conflict area and highly vulnerable to attack, particularly in Sarajevo. Limited road and rail access would further constrain force deployment. Greater discussion of climatic and infrastructure constraints is provided in the following section on time.

Constraints of Time.

Time is the vital and dynamic element in considering military intervention in Bosnia. Time determines the feasibility of military action; time constraints effect all planning factors from logistics, training and force structure, the negotiation process, and American domestic policy. But above all, action must be timely - is there sufficient time to mount military operations capable of freezing hostilities and allowing meaningful negotiations to continue?

Negotiations. If military forces are to be employed in Bosnia, the timing of any action must be intrinsic to the negotiation process. Present circumstances within Bosnia seem to convey an urgent need for immediate action. If negotiators resort to the "classic ultimatum" and demand a specific response from Bosnian Serbs within a specified time¹⁰ with military intervention for noncompliance, military forces must be in place and ready to fulfill the ultimatum. This requires in-theater build up of arms, men, and supplies before the ultimatum is delivered. To do otherwise sends a signal of weak resolve and inadequate force which may precipitate a strike in response to the ultimatum.

However, the very assembly of necessary firepower could derail the negotiation process. Concentrated forces may indicate lack of commitment to negotiating a mutually agreeable, peaceful settlement and that force will be used to achieve a predetermined end state. Large, offensively armed

forces also tend to rapidly lose the appearance of objectivity, even if designated as United Nations peacekeepers. If the Bosnian Serbs see military response - peacekeepers becoming peacemakers - as inevitable to any disagreement during negotiations, the incentive for diplomatic settlement is irrevocably lost. On the Bosnian Croat and Muslim sides, the protection provided by heavily armed troops may ease the pressure to end the war and lead to increased demands at the negotiating table.

If lack of allied unity makes the ultimatum an empty threat, it is highly probable that the intensity and regional scope of warfare would escalate beyond control. Unless the European Community (EC), NATO and the United Nations Security Council agree and commit to employing the decisive forces required to pacify the Bosnia area of conflict, the diplomatic arena has little to gain from military intervention.

Forces. Sufficient lead time is also required to build the international critical mass necessary for successfully fielding United Nations sponsored coalition forces. The composition of these forces must be carefully constructed to present a unified commitment to ending conflict in the Balkans. With peacekeepers in theater and ongoing European Community/United Nations joint negotiations, unilateral American action is not an option. Instead, the United States should consider taking a supporting role, allowing Europeans to retain the lead. While the United States prefers to retain

command and control, assigning limited American forces to a European/NATO dominated coalition would reduce time constraints on cold environment training/equipment, logistics, and host nation support agreements while controlling direct involvement of American troops. In this manner American fighting forces retain the ability to support and respond to other regional hotspots while fully supporting United Nations and European allied action in the Balkans. All such action may be taken without assuming a posture threatening to the increasing number of Third World United Nations member countries also experiencing internal conflict.

Logistics. The ability to logistically deploy and support significant American forces is controlled by time. Bosnia is almost half the world away in the mountainous heartland of the former Yugoslavia. Access from sea is through Croatia or Montenegro; build-up of military troops and equipment would be required on European land bases at a time when the United States is under great pressure to reduce forward deployed land forces. The large majority of arms and supplies would require continuous, massive airlift to a forward staging area. Force size, aircraft availability, and maintenance, equipment, and sustainment supplies generate massive lead time requirements; the pre-Desert Storm build-up required six months of intensive air and sea lift into secure airfields and modern ports. And unlike the Gulf War, this time the logistics effort must include food, water and fuel

not available in theater.

Subsequent movement of US and allied troops, equipment, and supplies would again require massive airlift. It is probable that preceding special forces would be required to secure suitable airfields. Continuous air cover and ground artillery support would be required for sustained air operations in an area where Bosnian Serbs have already demonstrated their proficiency with surface to air weapons against humanitarian relief flights. An additional factor would be the requirement to maintain these relief flights into Sarajevo. Without sustaining food, medical, and comfort supplies, the Muslim populace long under siege would probably not survive. Competing schedules for operational and relief flights plus demand for air space/facilities greatly compounds the difficulties of sustained airlift.

The alternative to airlift is establishing a land corridor for transporting troops and equipment from forward land bases or amphibious ships in the Adriatic Sea. Given the mountainous terrain, extreme cold, transit time, and threat of a highly mobile militia, establishing an overland supply route verges on the impossible. Major General Lewis McKenzie, former commander of United Nations forces in Bosnia, estimated requirements of 600,000 to 800,000 troops "as a starting point" under such circumstances.¹¹ Without in-theater support, the list of coordinating details is endless: medical supplies and personnel, field hospitals, ordnance, spare

parts, special clothing, maps.

Logistics is the determining factor in any military initiative; and the greater the amount of material, the longer it takes to move. Time is on the side of the Bosnian Serbs who have already driven more than one million Bosnian Muslims and Croats from their homes¹² and now control large amounts of territory. Given the magnitude of the effort, it is extremely unlikely that any considerable American or European forces can be placed in area, ready to fight before the Serbs complete their ethnic cleansing of Bosnia.

American Agenda. On the United States home front, the timing is exceptionally bad for engaging in additional military ventures. Military forces are already heavily involved in humanitarian relief to Somalia and post war stability operations against Iraq in the Gulf. The Marine Corps and Army presence in Somalia and involvement in armed clashes with Somali irregulars has extended beyond original expectations and Americans have taken to heart the three Marine casualties. A carrier and her supporting ships still loiter in Gulf waters while land based air forces stand ready for renewed air strikes against Iraq. In both Somalia and the Gulf, continued American presence is required for stability, with no immediate end in sight.

The 1992 presidential campaign made it resoundingly clear that the American public expected its government to focus on domestic rather than international issues. Public education,

health care, unemployment, and the economy were priority number one. The tremendous cost and international focus of military operations in Bosnia may delay tackling the tough home issues. The increased post Cold War Defense budget cuts are also demanding military leaders to restructure from top to bottom. The heat is on to develop doctrine and tailor smaller forces to meet future threats. It is questionable whether the decreasing Defense Department man and money resources could successfully sustain three major military commitments in Somalia, the Gulf, and Bosnia.

Conversely, the heat is also on President Clinton's new democratic presidency. During his presidential bid, then Governor Clinton made significant campaign promises, including air strikes enforcing the no-fly zone and supporting Bosnia relief efforts, which he has not addressed as president. Renewed attention to the President's unfamiliarity with the defense establishment, focus on special interest groups and failure to fulfill campaign promises may place the new administration in a defensive posture. If so, the United States may lack resolve at a crucial time in Bosnia negotiations or commit forces to hasty action for action's sake.

Forces.

United Nations peacekeeping forces have been on the ground in Bosnia since January 1992.¹³ They have been largely

ineffective in reducing hostilities between the Bosnian combatants because they are cast in the impossible role of maintaining peace where peace is not desired. The Bosnian Serbs routinely negotiate and immediately break cease fires. Their response to sanctions has been escalation of conflict and greater human rights violations. It is highly unlikely that simply placing more Peacekeeping forces in Bosnia would bring any greater success. In fact, the movement of French and British aircraft carriers into the Adriatic Sea signals a shift from peacekeeping to a more offensive posture.

With multinational forces already in place, it is logical to assume that any increased military presence would also be international in character. These forces should clearly reflect an extensive European commitment to resolving the Balkan conflict, particularly since Germany's early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent republics may have been instrumental in beginning the Bosnia war.¹⁴ However, the European Community seems particularly reluctant to take any decisive action in the Balkans, even though they have the greater interest - economically and geographically - in bringing peace to the troubled Balkan region. With the opening of borders and the developing European Common Market, the European Community is now uniquely able to make a unified effort for peace with their eastern neighbors.

Since European countries have the greater interest, a Bosnia coalition should be composed of NATO and European

Community members operating under United Nations approval but with a European, preferably NATO, commander. Military forces should not be placed under United Nations command where action is limited to self defense and forces are subject to hostage and high casualties if offensive action is subsequently taken. It is unlikely that any request for United Nations modification of self defense rules would be resolved in time to constitute and field an effective military force. Designating NATO command of the coalition would provide leadership experienced in joint, multinational operations and forces with interoperable weapons, communications, and support systems. As a lesser interested partner, American forces should be under the Nato commander but limited to selected support functions. Areas of assistance such as sea/air lift and resupply would be preferable as command and control of individual operating units may be retained.

Can Military Forces Win.

Perhaps the most important question regarding American military action in Bosnia is can the objective be achieved: can we win? As detailed above, the difficulty in defining the mission and the desired end state, the terrain, the depth of ethnic hatreds, a well armed, mobile Serbian militia, and the systematic brutalization of civilians all point to an operational theater prime for escalation of hostility and massive commitment of troops. Some would argue why pay for

fancy weapons and globally deployable forces if they are not then used in behalf of world peace. The issue is not whether the United States has the technology or ability to engage in show of force operations in Bosnia. Rather it is what would force accomplish and can the application of force resolve the conflict.

These questions must be answered before the first elements of American force are committed. Whether a military mission is executed by selected air strikes on military targets in Bosnia or Special Forces covert raids on Serbian artillery emplacements, once the first shot is fired, the scope of warfare in Bosnia is forever changed. Military force replaces diplomacy as the means of conflict resolution and it becomes axiomatic that defense of Bosnia becomes translated into defeating Serbs.

By committing massive land and air forces to full scale war, the United States could end hostilities between the Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims - at least temporarily. But except through the news media, Bosnia is largely unknown. While Americans may feel compelled to provide humanitarian aid, it is questionable whether offensive action would have continued support once the first casualties were suffered. In Desert Storm, national vital interests in protecting access to oil reserves justified a short term, powerful military offensive. Bosnia, however, must be seen as a long term commitment and, like Vietnam, it would be very difficult for

the average American to determine what we are fighting for.

Cost may be the overriding factor in American support of operations in Bosnia. Although the demands of a large scale military offensive may temporarily boost the American economy, the overall effect would be the diversion of resources and efforts away from pressing social and economic concerns. There are strong American feelings about not becoming the enforcement arm of the United Nations and the designated policeman of world affairs. The focus of the American people has shifted from international to domestic concerns; any distractions from tackling economic issues may not long enjoy public support.

On the other hand, what happens if we do not use military force in Bosnia? The Bosnian Serbs now hold over 70% of Bosnia territory and are close to attaining a Serb majority. To this end, their brutal tactics and continued aggression while playing at the negotiating table have allowed them to win by default. Although the current peace plan reduces their territory to approximately 40%, the Bosnian Serb aggression has still been rewarded by increased land holdings. There is no incentive to negotiate or cease offensive actions and hostilities may easily spread. Ethnic Albanians are becoming the majority in the Yugoslav Federation of Kosovo. Serbia's historic claims to Macedonia may draw Turkey, any thereby NATO, into the conflict. Already there is renewed fighting in Croatia. Middle East Muslim states have expressed concern

over the international community's reluctance to more forcibly aid fellow Muslims in Bosnia. With the potential for expanded hostilities by parties who do not seem to want a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of conflict, eventual use of force may be the only means of containing this regional conflict.

If military forces can contain the conflict, what they cannot do is solve the problem and actually end the war in Bosnia. As the reason for war is within the people, the answer must be also come from the people. If Bosnia's borders are defended without some resolution of the ethnic and nationalistic roots of conflict, any peace will be merely a precursor to renewed conflict. No matter how the land is divided, an ethnic majority and minority will remain, holding the seeds of renewed ethnic fighting. If this is the case, the continuous presence of forces will be required to maintain the artificially contrived peace.

CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDATIONS ON EMPLOYING UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN BOSNIA

Prior to committing US Forces to combat it must be determined that US vital interests are at risk and that political, diplomatic and economic measures have failed to correct the situation.¹

The Bosnia conflict presents very complex social and national issues; the international community's best courses of action will only be apparent in retrospect. If unchecked, this ethnic war has great potential for continued escalation of hostilities, human rights violations, and spread to surrounding countries. However, there is considerable lack of European and American enthusiasm for military intervention. Prospects for a diplomatic solution are waning, and there are no alternative actions proposed if negotiations fail.

The following are recommendations concerning military action in Bosnia.

- * The United States has a national security interest in the regional stability of the Bosnia area of conflict and humanitarian concerns over the human rights violations of ethnic cleansing.

- * All diplomatic and economic measures are not considered exhausted.

* United States military forces should not be sent to Bosnia as United Nations peacekeepers unless there is an established cease fire and renewed commitment to cease hostilities.

* If diplomacy fails, United States armed forces should not be deployed to Bosnia unless there is a unified European and American commitment to a decisive offensive using overwhelming, predominantly European coalition forces. The objective would be to quickly seize all Bosnian territory, establish military control, and place under UN mandate for resolution of ethnic, national issues.

* If offensive armed forces are employed, the United States should endorse the use of predominantly European coalition forces sanctioned by the United Nations but under NATO control. NATO coalition forces should be under European command with limited United States military involvement.

In conjunction with military force considerations, the United States should:

* Continue to support United Nations/European Community led negotiations and encourage a

diplomatic resolution of hostilities. A European solution to a European problem is essential; the US should assume the role of an active and interested partner, not leader.

* Recommend overwhelming economic pressures be placed on Serbs to cease hostilities. Trade partnerships with the developing European economic community will be vital for economic recovery of all factions of the conflict.

* Recommend war crimes hearings only if all diplomatic efforts fail and forceful intervention is required.

* Propose withdrawal of all United Nations peacekeepers from Bosnia unless an immediate cease fire is established and maintained. Peacekeepers cannot function if both sides to a conflict continue hostile action. Retaining peacekeepers in Bosnia after their mission has failed places them in increasing danger and makes them hostage if any offensive action is taken. Withdrawal of peacekeepers may also stimulate renewed negotiations by signaling an end to international patience with diplomatic stonewalling.

* Recommend lifting the arms embargo. The embargo is only hurting the people we are trying to assist; Serb forces are well armed and are resupplied through the Yugoslav Republic. As Bosnia is recognized as an independent state, the deeper issue is whether the arms embargo has removed a legitimate right of self defense. Although it presents an ethical challenge, it should be considered whether the best long term solution of this civil war is to let the people directly concerned fight their way to an ending.

Conclusions. Balkans history shows that foreign domination and military forces are not very effective in establishing long standing borders. Military intervention by European and United States forces may temporarily suppress hostilities; only the Balkans people may solve the problems caused by ethnic diversity.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

The war in Bosnia poses critical issues in regional stability, humanitarian operations, and human rights. This ethnic conflict is exceptionally complex and emotional; the depth of historic hatreds and brutalities of ethnic warfare present an enormous challenge to the international community. At the heart is consideration of how a people and a nation are defined, and what the parameters are for self determination of people in a civil, ethnic war. There are no easy answers; yet how this conflict is resolved sets the example for future regional disputes.

The ongoing hostilities in Bosnia have challenged the suitability of employing United Nations peacekeepers in this type of war. United Nations resolutions and sanctions appear impotent when the parties in conflict resist peaceful settlement of conflict and there is no force support. Even if the resolve to use force existed within the European Community and the United States, there are no easy answers in how force may best be applied. The logistical difficulties, time constraints, force composition, and problems in defining the mission objectives all contribute to the reluctance to wage war. Finally, the cost of any action, peacekeeping or peacemaking, must be calculated in terms of dollars and lives lost. The success or failure of any future military actions

will be determined by the willingness of the American people
to pay this price.

APPENDIX I

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONS

TABLE I

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS ON CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

1991

RESOLUTION 713—25 September: Urged parties to conflict to abide strictly by cease-fire; imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment.

RESOLUTION 721—27 November: Urged compliance with 23 November cease-fire agreement; approved efforts towards possible establishment of a UN peace-keeping operation.

RESOLUTION 724—15 December: Approved the concept and plan (S/23280) for a UN peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia; established committee to monitor arms embargo.

RESOLUTION 749—7 April: Authorized earliest possible full deployment of UNPROFOR, the second largest peace-keeping operation in UN history.

RESOLUTION 752—15 May: Demanded an immediate end to fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to forcible expulsions and attempts to change the entire composition of the population, anywhere in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the immediate cessation of all outside interference; welcomed efforts of European Community to achieve a peaceful solution.

RESOLUTION 757—30 May: Imposed wide-ranging sanctions against Yugoslavia under Chapter VII of UN Charter, including an air embargo; demanded that unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies be facilitated and a security zone at Sarajevo airport created. Arms embargo committee to monitor compliance.

RESOLUTION 760—18 June: Exempted "commodities and products for essential humanitarian need" from general embargo against Yugoslavia.

RESOLUTION 761—29 June: Decided to deploy additional UNPROFOR elements to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport; called for absolute and unconditional cease-fire. "In the absence of cooperation", the Council "does not exclude other measures" to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs.

RESOLUTION 762—30 June: Established a joint commission to oversee restoration of Croatian authority in "pink zones"; authorized more military observers and civilian police for UNPROFOR.

1992

RESOLUTION 727—8 January: Welcomed signing of Implementing Accord at Sarajevo on 2 January; dispatched 50 military liaison officers to help maintain ceasefire.

RESOLUTION 740—7 February: Asked that preparations for peace-keeping force be expedited.

RESOLUTION 743—21 February: Established the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) for 12-month period to create conditions of peace and security for negotiating overall settlement.

RESOLUTION 758—8 June: Enlarged mandate of UNPROFOR and authorized further deployments to help reopen the airport for humanitarian deliveries; condemned cease-fire violations.

Source: "Wide-Ranging Sanctions Imposed Against Yugoslavia", UN Chronicle, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 1992, p.7.

APPENDIX II

LANGUAGES, ETHNIC GROUPS, AND RELIGIONS
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS

TABLE I

LANGUAGES, ETHNIC GROUPS, AND RELIGIONS:
PERCENT REPRESENTATION
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS

YUGOSLAVIA (FORMER)

Languages	%	Ethnic Groups	%	Religions	%
Serbo-Croatian*	72	Serbian	36	Orthodox	35
Slovenian*	8	Croatian	20	Roman Catholic	26
Albanian	8	Bosnian	9	Atheist	17
Macedonian*	6	Slovene	8	Christian, other	11
Hungarian	2	Albanian	8	Muslim	10
Romany	2	Macedonian	6	Other	1
Italian	1	Montenegrin	3		
Other	1	Other	10		

*=Official Language(s). A=Principal and B=Other if percentage unavailable.

Language percentages refer to native speakers (--- means less than 1%).


Source: FC Globe 5.0, The New World Order, Broderbund,
1992.

APPENDIX III

HISTORICAL BORDERS
OF EASTERN EUROPE

FIGURE 1

HISTORICAL BORDERS:
EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 9TH CENTURY



Source: Maps on File, New York, NY: Martin Greenwald Associates, Inc.

FIGURE 2

HISTORICAL BORDERS:
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1680




Source: Maps on File, New York, NY: Martin Greenwald Associates, Inc.

APPENDIX IV

LAND FEATURES OF
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS

FIGURE 1


REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC BORDERS
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS



Source: Maps on File, New York, NY: Martin Greenwald Associates, Inc.

FIGURE 2


TOPOGRAPHY OF
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS



Source: PC Globe 5.0, The New World Order, Broderbund, 1992.

FIGURE 3


TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS



Source: Maps on File, New York, NY: Martin Greenwald Associates, Inc.

FIGURE 4

MAJOR CITIES
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS



Source: PC Globe 5.0, The New World Order, Broderbund, 1992.

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CHAPTER IV

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